I saw an article in Investment News a day or so ago on this topic but after reading the article, could not tell what new event had led to the story. But, it led me to consider that even with a Democratic Congress in its infancy, there have already been bills submitted which would essentially abolish mandatory arbitration. So, the debate over whether FINRA should abolish the practice of mandating one industry arbitrator on each panel of arbitrators is again cutting edge. (FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, is the organization that resulted from the merger of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.’s regulatory arm.)
The article by Dan Jamieson of Investment News contained the claim that industry arbitrators were the “good guys” because they were harder on industry “ne’er do wells” than public arbitrators.
Sometimes that is true and sometimes it is not.
FINRA provides to litigants a database that contains all of the decisions of every arbitrator proposed for an arbitration. Counsel can study the past decisions of an arbitrator and, if there are enough of them, can also develop a model of the arbitrators’ decision making proclivities that is sometimes predictive. For example, if an arbitrator has never awarded any money, or never an amount seemingly reflective of the claims, after sitting on several panels, it should be pretty clear that they are not likely to do it. Counsel for the aggrieved customer or aggrieved employee should not count on a break through with that arbitrator.
Many lawyers select arbitrators based solely on their respect for the arbitrator. While that is a good criteria, it should not be the only one. The mathematics of past decisions should be equal to or greater than subjective impressions. Half a dozen decisions is usually enough to gauge a prospective arbitrator, but a dozen is much better. Simple math tricks can also help: weighting types of cases, weighting the quality of counsel that have appeared in those past cases, weighting the awards, and dropping highs and lows. The passage of time should be considered; decisions more than a decade old may not truly reflect that an arbitrator has matured or ripened.
Arbitrators that have developed a decisional history that omits monetary awards are more often than not former branch managers. It is not hard to decipher the cause. Branch managers are historically front line cannon fodder for the wirehouses and appear at arbitrations as the company representative. They would not be sitting there, sometimes with their own career or future prospects on the line, if not for a customer or that disgruntled employee. At the very least, if there is an award by the panel, it usually comes off the bottom line of their office, and more directly, out of their bonus. It leaves an impression that is usually indelible. Even after many years of retirement, most former branch managers cannot strike that feeling of déjà vu. While most former or retired branch managers that are experienced arbitrators will deny that their bitter moments in arbitrations of long ago do not impact them in the here and now, their published voting pattern usually reveals something else.
Some of the most respected arbitrators are often the first struck from a prospective panel by students of their decisional histories. What would improve the standing of industry arbitrators is more stringent disclosures, including things such as the number of times the industry arbitrator has testified, the number of times they have acted as a company designee in litigation and arbitration, and clearer disclosures about whether they have ever suffered a professional or monetary set back because of an arbitrated claim. The current system of disclosures needs a tune up and bolt tightening.