Terra Extraneus

The free expression of religious speech has received another setback from a Des Moines federal court when it squelched a Prison Fellowship program in a state prison. The decision is nonsensical; inmates who had no fear about breaking criminal laws would have no difficulty refusing to participate in a Prison Fellowship program.

The other side of the coin is “ecclesiastical privilege,” the body of law that prevents government and courts from intruding into church governance. Two recent court decisions demonstrate the breadth of the “flipside” of the Establishment Clause’s present abusive application. The “other side” of the Establishment Clause might even be a fair offset to decisions like the one in Des Moines. But is it?

In a case involving a United Methodist church, a case which can be read on the Oklahoma State Courts Network (at 2006 OK CIV APP 79), the defamation claim of the youth minister was dismissed under the doctrine. In a Texas case which also involved a Methodist church, the Third Circuit Texas appellate court also dismissed the defamation claim of a youth minister.

In the Oklahoma case, the senior minister told a member of the congregation, a young person, that the reason for the youth minister’s termination was because the youth minister was “questioning his sexuality.” The allegation was shocking, and the fact that a senior minister felt free to communicate it to a “young member,” as reported in the opinion, was equally shocking.

In the Texas case, the youth minister’s dating life was subjected to scrutiny, as well as accusations that he was putting his arm around some “girls” in the church. Apparently the rumors were sufficiently troubling that two more senior ministers were considering terminating him. One of the ministers took notes of the meeting between them, and the youth minister found the notes on the photocopy machine. Such a lapse, leaving the notes on the copy machine, also seems shocking and unprofessional. Like the Oklahoma court, the Texas court dismissed the defamation claim.

Other than a sad commentary on the lack of professionalism in the salaried clergy, and other than a sad commentary on the abrupt and callous handling of youth ministers, which are typically younger, less experienced, and new to ministry, both churches and their ministers had free reign without civil law accountability. Maybe this is as it should be in churches, in order to fully effectuate the Establishment Clause. Most business people would like to have the same shield.

These published appellate opinions have shed some light on personnel problems that churches should address differently, and probably with greater professionalism as well as more compassion. Also, in both instances, there was the availability of denominational resources, some of which should be devoted to Human Resources management and training.

The “right” of the matter cannot be determined in either case merely from the appellate opinions, but what is clear is that enormous resources in legal fees were probably wasted by both sides, tithed resources, no doubt, that could have been better spent solving the problems. If someone is indeed not cut out for the ministry, the amount spent in legal fees would still have been less than severance or retraining resources for youth ministers unready or unqualified for the mission.